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Abstract
We study a Downsian model of electoral competition with an ar-
bitrary number of parties. The voting rule is approval voting. We
assume that voters are strategic in the sense of the Leader Rule of
Laslier (2009, Jnl. Th. Pol.). We show that if a Condorcet winner pol-
icy exists, then there exists an electoral competition equilibrium sup-
porting this policy. Moreover, if the set of policies is one-dimensional
and voters have single-peaked preferences, then it is the only electoral
competition equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In large societies, collective decisions cannot be taken directly but have to be
delegated to professional decision makers. In a democracy, these delegates are
typically elected through a competitive mechanism. The simplest expression
of such a mechanism is the now standardDownsian model of Politics (Downs,
1951) in which a relatively small number of candidates face a relatively large
number of voters, the candidates are purely oﬃce-motivated and the voters
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policy-motivated. For the purpose of winning the election, each candidate
freely and independently proposes a policy from a fixed and common set of
possible policies. Voters are only interested in policies and not in candidates
per se. They trust that the elected candidate will implement the policy she
is proposing.
The usual case in the literature considers only two candidates under plu-
rality voting. Then voters only face a binary choice, so that each voter simply
votes for the candidate whose policy she prefers. In that case, competition for
oﬃce drives the candidates to propose popular policies. In particular, if there
exists a policy preferred to any other by a majority of voters – a Condorcet
alternative – then both candidates propose this same policy. This statement
is even an if and only if statement since, as soon as no Condorcet alterna-
tive exists, the two-party Downsian game has no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Formal political science has studied this question in great details, and the
literature on two-party competition under plurality rule is very large; see for
instance the books of Ordeshook (1992), Roemer (2001), Mueller (2003), or
Austen-Smith and Banks (2005). This chapter is devoted to the study of mul-
tiparty electoral competition under approval voting in the Downsian political
context where collective choice is delegated to oﬃce-motivated candidates.
To recall, approval voting is the electoral rule under which voters are given
the right to approve of as many candidates as they wish, and each approval
gives one point to the approved candidate. The winner of the election is the
candidate having received the largest number of approvals.
Rational behavior of the voters rests on their beliefs about two things.
On one hand, they have to wonder which candidate is most likely to win the
election and which candidates can challenge this front-runner. On the other
hand, they have to make up their mind as to the policies that each candidate
would implement, if elected. Rational behavior of the candidates choosing
platform campaigns, in turn, rests on their knowledge about the choices of
the voters and of the other candidates. We study electoral competition in
a framework where the candidates choose rationally (and simultaneously)
their political platforms, and the voters react to these platforms. With more
than two candidates, not only the voting rule matters but the behavior of
voters is no longer as straightforward as it is with two candidates. Studying
approval voting, we make the assumption that voters follow the Leader Rule,
a behavioral rule which has a rational foundation (Laslier 2009) and satisfies
the criterion of sincerity of Brams and Fishburn (1986) and admissibility of
Dellis (2010).
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We prove that when voters follow that rule, the outcome of the electoral
competition among candidates converges towards the Condorcet winner pol-
icy in the following sense: if a Condorcet winner policy exists, then there
exists an equilibrium that supports it; and if, moreover, the set of policies is
one-dimensional and voters’ preferences are single-peaked, then this equilib-
rium is the only one. The prediction of the model is thus that the approval
voting electoral rule drives oﬃce-motivated candidates to policy moderation.
In Section 2, we present the model and we recall the definition of the
Leader Rule. In Section 3, we present the results. In Section 4, we discuss
some possible extensions.
2 The model
2.1 Candidates, voters, and preferences
There is a set X of possible policies. We consider two models below. In the
first one, X is a finite set with no particular structure. In the second one, X
is the real line.
In both models we make the following assumptions on voters and candi-
dates. There is a set {1, ..., N} of N voters. Voters have preferences over X.
There is a set {1, ...,K} of K candidates. Each candidate k ∈ {1, ...,K} has
to choose a policy
xk ∈ X.
We assume that policy xk is implemented if candidate k is elected. Conse-
quently, a voter prefers candidate k to candidate k0 if and only if she prefers
xk to xk0, k, k0 ∈ {1, ..., K}, and we can equally well speak in terms of pref-
erence over candidates or preference over policies.
The way voters vote among policies {x1, ..., xK} is described below. Let
us begin by describing the preferences of the candidates. As a result of the
election, a fraction of the voters, which we denote by s(k), approve of policy
xk, k ∈ {1, ...,K}. The number of approvals of k is thus Ns(k). This number
is called the score of k. The winning candidate is the one with highest score.
If several candidates obtain the same, highest, score, the winner is decided
by a fair lottery. We assume that the objective of a candidate is to maximize
the probability of winning the election.
Let x, y ∈ X. Voters may prefer x to y, y to x, or be indiﬀerent. We
assume that the profile of voters’ preferences over X is fixed. Given this
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preference profile of the population {1, ..., N}, we can compute g(x, y) ∈
[0, 1], the fraction of the voters who strictly prefer x to y and i(x, y) ∈ [0, 1],
the fraction of the voters who are indiﬀerent between x and y. Note that
g(x, y) − g(y, x) measures the relative plurality in favor of policy x against
policy y. By definition,
g(x, y) + g(y, x) + i(x, y) = 1.
We suppose that the number of voters is large.
2.2 Individual voting behavior
Let us now describe how voters choose their vote. Here, we follow the behav-
ioral rule developed in Laslier (2009) and we adapt it to the current model.
A rational voter responds to the number of approval votes granted by the
other voters to the various candidates (their scores). Let us assume that s(k)
represents the fraction of voters approving of k when we do not take account
of a given voter’s vote. First, the voter deduces from (s(1), . . . , s(K)) a strict
ranking c1, c2, ..., cK of the candidates. Candidate c1 is the leader, according
to that voter. This ranking needs to be compatible with the scores in the
following sense.
Definition 1 The ranking c1, c2, ..., cK of the candidates is compatible with
a score vector s = (s(1), . . . , s(K)) if for all k, k0 ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
s(ck) > s(ck0)⇒ k < k0.
If the score vector is such that the K candidates have distinct scores then
there is a unique compatible ranking. That is the case analysed in Laslier
(2009). Otherwise, the candidates with identical scores can be ranked in any
way, providing multiple compatible rankings.
Recall that each voter has fixed preferences over X. For any list of policy
positions x = {x1, . . . , xK}, there is an induced preference relation of this
voter over candidates. When the voter has strict preferences over the candi-
dates, the Leader Rule stipulates that she approves of all the candidates she
strictly prefers to c1 and of no candidate she finds strictly worse than c1, and
she votes for c1 if and only if she prefers c1 to c2. When the voter is likely to
be indiﬀerent to several candidates, the rule can be generalized as follows.
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Assumption 1 Leader Rule: Given a strict ranking c1, c2, ..., cK of the
candidates, a voter behaves as follows:
• If she is indiﬀerent among all candidates, then she approves each of
them with probability 1/2, independently.
In all other cases, for any candidate d:
• If the voter is not indiﬀerent between d and c1, she approves of d if and
only if she prefers d to c1.
• If she is indiﬀerent between d and c1 (for instance in the case d = c1),
she approves of d if and only if she prefers d to ci, where ci is the first
candidate, according to the ranking c1, c2, ..., cK who is not indiﬀerent
with c1.
If the score vector is such that the K candidates have distinct scores,
then this postulated behavior defines a unique ballot for any voter, except in
the case where all candidates are indiﬀerent. If the score vector contains ties,
several rankings of the candidates are compatible. That may lead to diﬀerent
responses for some voters. For instance, let us assume that s(1) = s(2) > s(3)
and the preferences of the voter are: Candidate 1 is preferred to candidate 3,
preferred to candidate 2. If the strict ranking of the candidates compatible
with scores is 1, 2, 3, then the voter approves only of 1. If the ranking is 2,
1, 3, then she approves of 1 and 2.
Let us briefly present the rationale for the Leader Rule. Assume that
the scores represent how voters plan to vote, but for each voter and for each
candidate she plans to approve, there is a small chance ² that the vote is not
recorded, or that she forgets to cast that vote, etc. Then, the actual number
of approvals for a candidate k ∈ K becomes a random variable of mean
(1− ²)Ns(k). As a consequence, in spite of the fact that the expected scores
of two candidates diﬀer, there is always a positive probability that they tie,
so that the vote of this voter is pivotal. Reasoning on these pairwise ties
and neglecting three-way ties, a voter votes for a candidate if and only if the
most likely serious tie event involving that candidate is one where the former
is strictly preferred to the latter (a tie is serious if the voter is not indiﬀerent
between the two candidates). Laslier (2009) proves that it gives the above
voting behavioral rule, and Nunez (2010) presents this rule and other related
models for large electorates.
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2.3 Electorate voting
To define the electorate response to a score vector s = {s(1), . . . , s(K)},
suppose that s has exactly M compatible rankings. We make the assump-
tion that a proportion 1/M of the population of voters adopts each of these
rankings, independently of the types. For instance, in the above example
s(1) = s(2) > s(3), among all voters sharing the same preferences, fifty per
cent will behave according to the ranking 1, 2, 3, and fifty per cent according
to 2, 1, 3. This assumption only makes sense in suﬃciently large populations.
This is precisely our definition of a large population.
Assumption 2 Uniform tie-breaking: Given a score vector s, each voter
chooses a ranking of the candidates compatible with s, and responds to this
ranking. The choice of the ranking is uniform among the rankings compatible
with s, and it is independent of the voter’s preferences and of the other voters’
choices.
The above assumptions form a simple and natural extension of the Leader
Rule defined by Laslier (2009) to handle the possibility of ties, although it is
only justified by some kind of law of insuﬃcient reason, as is often the case
for uniform rules. Notice that, in any case, since each ballot is defined by the
Leader Rule applied to the appropriate ranking, all ballots are sincere and
admissible.
2.4 Equilibrium
We define an electoral competition game as one with K +N players, the K
candidates and the N voters. In the first stage of the game, each candidate k
chooses a policy xk ∈ X. In the second stage of the game, voters vote, using
approval voting. Each vote has a given probability of not being recorded,
as explained above. Depending on which votes are recorded, candidates
receive numbers of approvals. The candidate with the largest number of
approvals is the winner of the election. Ties are broken by a fair lottery.
Voters derive utility from the (lottery over) policies that were chosen by the
winning candidates. Candidates derive utility from the probability of being
elected.
If we restrict our attention to the second stage of the game, then we are
back to the game studied by Laslier (2009) except that candidates’ score
vector can now contain ties. The Leader Rule tells us how voters react
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to the expected vector of scores. Now, the expected vector of scores itself
is completely determined by the voters’ expected votes. The equilibrium
notion we consider, which we call uniform consistency, is the fixed point of
that relation.
Definition 2 A score vector s = (s1, s2, ..., s3) is uniformly consistent
with policy positions x = (x1, x2, ..., xK) if s is the score vector that is obtained
when voters react, according to assumptions 1 and 2, to s itself.
We are interested in the subgame perfect equilibria of the electoral com-
petition game. Using the above definition, such an equilibrium is a pair (x, s)
of positions and scores such that s is uniformly consistent with x and for no
candidate k there exists a unilateral deviation x0 = (x0k, x−k) and a score
vector s0 uniformly consistent with x0 such that the probability of k winning
the election is higher in s0 than in s.
For the sake of completeness, we prove the following result, which consists
of adapting Laslier’s result to the current framework. That results concerns
cases where candidates choose policies in such a way that no voter is indif-
ferent between any two policies. In those cases, if a strict Condorcet winner
policy exists, then there is a unique score vector uniformly consistent with
it. That vector is easily built by using the g function.
Recall that a Condorcet winner policy is one that is preferred to any other
by a majority of voters.
Definition 3 A list of policy positions x = (x1, x2, ..., xK) admits a Con-
dorcet winner policy x` if and only if for all k 6= `,
g(x`, xk) ≥ 1/2.
It admits a strict Condorcet winner if the above inequality is strict for all
k 6= `.
A policy x` may be a Condorcet winner in a list of policy positions x =
(x1, x2, ..., xK) even if there exists a policy y ∈ X that is preferred to x` by
a majority of voters, provided y is not in the list of policy positions. We will
come back on that key issue in the next section.
Proposition 1 Let us assume that the list of policy positions x = (x1, x2, ..., xK)
is such that no voter is indiﬀerent between any pair of policies. If x admits
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a strict Condorcet winner policy x`, then there exists a unique score vector s
that is uniformly consistent with x. This score vector is defined by: For all
k 6= `, sk = g(xk, x`) < 1/2, and
s` = min
k 6=`
g(x`, xk).
Proof. 1) The score vector s is consistent with x: Let L(2) denote the
set of candidates obtaining the second largest score. By construction, for all
k, k0 ∈ L(2) : g(xk, x`) = g(xk0 , x`). For all k ∈ L(2), a fraction 1|L(2)| of voters
has ranking `, k, . . .. Among those voters, a fraction g(x`, xk) vote for `, a
fraction g(xk, x`) vote for k, and for all h 6= `, k, a fraction g(xh, x`) vote for
h. Consequently,
s(`) =
1
|L(2)|
X
k∈L
g(x`, xk) = g(x`, xk0) ∀ k0 ∈ L(2),
and for all k 6= ` : s(k) = g(xk, x`). Finally, as for all k ∈ L(2), k0 /∈
L(2) ∪ {`} : s(k) > s(k0), by construction, g(xk, x`) > g(xk0 , x`). This implies
g(x`, xk) < g(x`, xk0) so that
s` = min
k 6=`
g(x`, xk).
2) Unicity: Let L(1) denote the set of candidates obtaining the largest score.
Assume ` /∈ L(1). Then,
s(`) =
1
|L(1)|
X
k∈L(1)
g(x`, xk) >
1
2
.
First case: L(1) contains more than one candidate. Then, for all k ∈ L(1),
s(k) =
1
|L(1)|
X
⎛
⎝k
0 ∈ L(1)
k0 6= k
⎞
⎠
g(xk, xk0) +
1
|L(1)|
1
|L(1)|− 1
X
⎛
⎝k
0 ∈ L(1)
k0 6= k
⎞
⎠
g(xk, xk0)
=
1
|L(1)|− 1
X
⎛
⎝k
0 ∈ L(1)
k0 6= k
⎞
⎠
g(xk, xk0).
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Summing up these scores, and recalling that g(xk, xk0) + g(xk0 , xk) = 1 (no
voter is indiﬀerent between xk and xk0), we getX
k∈L(1)
s(k) =
1
|L(1)|− 1
X
k,k0∈L(1)
g(xk, xk0) + g(xk0 , xk)
=
1
|L(1)|− 1
(|L(1)|)(|L(1)|− 1)
2
=
|L(1)|
2
,
so that for all k ∈ L(1) : s(k) = 1
2
. To summarize, we have s(k) < s(`),
a contradiction. Second case: L contains one candidate, say 1. We must
have s(1) > 1
2
and for all k in the set of candidates ranked second, s(k) =
g(xk, x1) <
1
2
, which is inconsistent with s(`) > 1
2
.
There are two important directions in which the above result does not
extend. First, even if the profile has a Condorcet winner, if the Condorcet
winner is not strict, then it is possible that no uniformly consistent scores
exist.
Example 1 Consider a set of three candidates {1, 2, 3} such that the pair-
wise comparisons among candidates are: g(x1, x2) = .5, g(x1, x3) = .6,
g(x2, x3) = .1. No uniformly consistent scores exist for this profile. To see that
one can check the impossibility for each ordering, strict or not, of the candi-
dates according to s. For instance if 1 is alone at the first place in s, 2 at the
second place, and 3 at the third, then the scores should be s1 = g(x1, x2) = .5
and s2 = g(x2, x1) = .5 also, a contradiction. If 1 and 2 tie at the first
place and 3 comes third, then s1 = g(x1, x2) = .5, s2 = g(x2, x1) = .5, and
s3 = (g(x3, x1) + g(x3, x2))/2 = .65 > .5, a contradiction. The reader will
easily complete this proof.
Second, if (a non-negligeable fractions of) voters have indiﬀerences, then
there may be several score vectors uniformly consistent with the policy posi-
tions and even a strict Condorcet winner may fail to be ranked first in such
a score vector.
Example 2 Consider a set of three candidates {1, 2, 3} and their policy posi-
tions x = (x1, x2, x3) inducing the preferences described in the following table
(which reads: 4 voters are indiﬀerent between 1 and 2 and strictly prefer any
of these two to 3, etc.):
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4 3 2
1, 2 3 3
3 1 2
2 1
Observe that 3 is a strict Condorcet winner. Nevertheless consider the
following score vector: s(1) = 7, s(2) = 6, s(3) = 5, in which candidate 3 is
ranked last. One can easily check that, applying the Leader Rule, all voters
vote for two candidates, and that this score vector is consistent with x.
Of course, if the profile of candidates has no Condorcet winner, it is all-
the-most possible that no uniformly consistent score exists. The fact that
uniformly consistent scores may fail to exist is a diﬃculty for the study of
electoral competition under AV in the general case, under the uniform tie-
breaking assumption. The results (in the next section) will thus be limited
to some observations, in the case of existence of a Condorcet winner.
The result conveyed in example 2 above involves preferences that are not
single-peaked: the only rankings compatible with the existence of preferences
312 and 321 would have 3 in the middle, which excludes preferences (12)3.
The last result in the next section shows that example 2 cannot hold if
preferences are single-peaked.
3 Results
We are now equipped to prove our two results. Both results hold even if
agents have indiﬀerences among some pairs of policy positions. They con-
firm the close relationship between approval voting and the Condorcet win-
ner. Proposition 3 essentially states that a Condorcet winner policy, if it
exists, can always result from electoral competition under approval voting,
and Proposition 3 essentially states that, in single-peaked domains, this is
the only possible outcome. The section is completed by showing that these
results do not hold if approval voting is replaced with plurality voting.
3.1 Condorcet-consistency
In the previous section, we defined a Condorcet winner by reference to a list
x = (x1, . . . , xK) of policy positions. If we look at the entire set X of possible
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policies, we can define a Condorcet winner policy as one that is preferred to
any other policy in X by a majority of voters. Let us note that there is no
logical relation between the existence of a Condorcet winner in X and the
existence of a Condorcet winner relative to a list of K policy positions in X.
The first result states that if a strict Condorcet winner exists in X, then,
independently of the structure of X, all candidates choosing that policy po-
sition is an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If xC ∈ X is a Condorcet winner policy then the strategy
profile in which all candidates choose xC is an equilibrium of the electoral
competition game. If xC is a strict Condorcet winner then the equilibrium is
strict.
Proof. Let xC ∈ X be a Condorcet winner policy. Let x = (x1, . . . , xK)
be defined by: For all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} : xk = xC. Then, by the Leader
Rule, each candidate is elected with probability 1/K. Suppose candidate
1 (for instance) deviates to x1 6= xC. There are now two diﬀerent policy
positions to choose from. Independently of how they are ranked, we have
s(1) = g(x1, x
C) ≤ .5 and for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} : s(k) = g(xC , x1) ≥ .5.
Candidate 1’s probability of being elected is now either 1/K or 0. In any
case, the deviation is not profitable. If xC is a strict Condorcet winner policy,
then s(1) = g(x1, xC) < .5 and for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} : s(k) = g(xC , x1) > .5.
Consequently, 1’s probability of being elected decreases to 0.
3.2 Median convergence
We consider in this section the standard, one-dimensional, single-peaked
model. The set of possible policies is the real line X = R. Each voter j ∈ N
has a preferred policy pj. Moreover, for two policies x, y ∈ X on the left of pj
(resp., on the right of pj), x is strictly preferred to y if and only if x is closer
to pj than y: y < x < pj (resp., pj < x < y). Let xm ∈ X be the median of
the voters’ preferred policies – as many voters have their preferred policy
at the left as at the right of xm. We suppose that this point exists and is
unique. Then, as is well-known, this policy-moderated, centrist outcome, xm
is a strict Condorcet winner: for any y 6= xm, g(xm, y) > .5, a strict ma-
jority of the population strictly prefers xm to y. The previous result applies
and all candidate policy positions being concentrated at the median point is
a strict equilibrium of the electoral competition. The following proposition,
11
our main result, also proves it is the only equilibrium. That shows that, un-
der approval voting, electoral competition drives candidates to propose the
Condorcet policy platform.
Proposition 3 In the single-peaked model: (i) The strategy profile in which
all candidates choose the median policy position is a strict equilibrium of the
electoral competition game. (ii) It is the only equilibrium.
Proof. Point (i) follows from Proposition 2. (ii) We first note three facts
related to the single-peaked profile structure. Let x, y, z ∈ X be such that
x < y < z.
• Fact 1: no voter is indiﬀerent between the three positions.
• Fact 2: the voters (if any) who are indiﬀerent between x and z strictly
prefer y to both x and z.
• Fact 3: g(y, x) ≥ g(z, x) and g(y, z) ≥ g(x, z).
Next we observe that, from the definition of the Leader Rule (Assumption
1), if two candidates k, k0, propose the same policy xk = xk0, they obtain the
same number of votes and any other candidate l obtains the same number of
votes as l would obtain if there was only one candidate at position xk. Now,
let x = (x1, . . . , xK) be some list of policy positions chosen by the candidates.
For the ease of reading, and when no confusion in the course of the proof
can arise, we can neglect the possibility of several candidates located at the
same position and we will speak of “a set of candidates” rather than “a set
diﬀerent policy positions chosen by candidates.”
There is at least one candidate, say 1, with a probability of winning
the election less than or equal to 1/K. We will prove that deviating to
x01 = x
m is profitable.1 Let s = (s(1), . . . , s(K)) be a score vector associated
to x0 = (x01 = x
m, x2, . . . , xK). Notice that s(1) is equal to or larger than
some average of g(xm, xk), for k ∈ {2, ...,K}, and because xm is a strict
Condorcet winner, s(1) > .5. Let L(1) denote the set of candidates obtaining
the largest score.
If all the candidates except candidate 1 are located at xm then the prob-
ability of winning goes from 0 to 1/K when candidate 1 deviates to xm. We
1We will thus prove that the equilibrium is in dominant strategy.
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can thus suppose that some candidates are not located at xm and we will
prove that when deviating to xm, 1 ∈ L(1) and L(1) contains at most K − 1
candidates, which makes the deviation profitable for candidate 1. Assume
1 /∈ L(1). We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: L(1) contains one candidate, say 2. Let L(2) denote the set of
candidates obtaining the second largest score. Assume that L(2) contains
more than one candidate. By Fact 1, all the scores of 2 and the candidates of
L(2) are determined by the preferences over these candidates. To simplify, let
L(2) = {k, k0} (the argument extends if there are more than two candidates).
If xk < x2 < xk0, then
s(2) =
g(2, k) + g(2, k0)
2
+ i(2, k) + i(2, k0),
s(k) = g(k, 2) + i(2, k),
s(k0) = g(k0, 2) + i(2, k0).
We compute s(k) + s(k0) = g(k, 2) + g(k0, 2) + i(2, k) + i(2, k0) < 1, so that
s(k) = s(k0) < .5, in contradiction to the fact that s(1) > .5. If x2 /∈ (xk, xk0),
then (assuming, w.l.o.g., xk ∈ (x2, xk0))
s(2) =
g(2, k) + g(2, k0)
2
+ i(2, k),
s(k) = g(k, 2) + i(2, k),
s(k0) = g(k0, 2).
Given that g(k, 2) ≥ g(k0, 2), this implies g(k, 2) = g(k0, 2) and i(2, k) = 0.
Therefore, s(2) > s(k) implies s(k) < .5, in contradiction to the fact that
s(1) > .5. That proves that L(2) contains one and only one candidate. We
cannot have L(2) = {1}, as this would imply s(2) < s(1), a contradiction.
Let L(2) = {k}. Therefore, we must have s(2) > s(k) > . . . ≥ s(1) ≥ . . . .
That implies s(1) ≥ g(1, 2) > .5. To have s(k) > s(1), it must be the
case that s(2) = g(2, k) + i(2, k) and s(k) = g(k, 2) + i(k, 2). By Fact 2,
x01 /∈ (x2, xk). Then, either x01 < x2 < x3 or x3 < x2 < x01. As a result,
g(1, k) > g(k, 2) + i(2, k), a contradiction.
Case 2: L(1) contains two candidates, say 2 and 3, with x2 ≤ x3. We have
s(1) ≥ g(x
0
1,x2)+g(x
0
1,x3)
2
> .5. Note that all voters who are indiﬀerent between
x2 and x3 vote exactly in the same way, as they all strictly prefer any policy
in (x2, x3) to either x2 or x3, and they prefer x2 or x3 to any position out of
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(x2, x3). Consequently, either
s(2) = g(x2, x3) + i(x2, x3)
s(3) = g(x3, x2) + i(x2, x3),
or
s(2) = g(x2, x3)
s(3) = g(x3, x2).
In either case, g(x2, x3) = g(x3, x2) which implies that x2 < x01 = x
m < x3
and s(1) = g(x01, x3)+ i(x2, x3). By Fact 3, s(1) ≥ s(2) = s(3), contradicting
the assumption on the score vector.
Case 3: L(1) contains three or more candidates, say 2, 3 and 4, with
x2 ≤ x3 ≤ x4 (a similar argument goes true if L(1) contains more than three
agents). By Assumption 2, s(2), s(3), s(4) are determined as the average be-
tween the scores that are compatible to any of the six possible strict rankings
of 1, 2, 3. The scores, for each ranking, are as follows.
s(2) s(3) s(4)
234 g(2, 3) + i(2, 3) g(3, 2) + i(2, 3) g(4, 2)
243 g(2, 4) g(3, 2) g(4, 2)
324 g(2, 3) + i(2, 3) g(3, 2) + i(2, 3) g(4, 3)
342 g(2, 3) g(3, 4) + i(3, 4) g(4, 3) + i(3, 4)
423 g(2, 4) g(3, 4) g(4, 2)
432 g(2, 4) g(3, 4) + i(3, 4) g(4, 3) + i(3, 4)
Using g(2, 3) ≤ g(2, 4) and g(4, 3) ≤ g(4, 2), we obtain
s(2) ≤ g(2, 4) + i(2, 3)
3
s(3) =
g(3, 2) + g(3, 4)
2
+
1
3
(i(2, 3) + i(3, 4))
s(4) ≤ g(4, 2) + i(3, 4)
3
Given that g(2, 4) + g(4, 2) ≤ 1 and g(3, 2) + g(3, 4) ≥ 1, we can only have
s(2) = s(3) = s(4) if i(2, 3) = i(2, 4) = i(3, 4) = 0 and g(3, 2) + g(3, 4) = 1.
Consequently, s(2) = s(3) = s(4) = .5 whereas s(1) > .5, a contradiction.
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That proves that 1 ∈ L(1). We want to prove that all candidates in L(1)
are located at xm. Assume two diﬀerent locations are represented in L(1):
L(1) = {1, k} with xk 6= xm. Then because xm is a strict Condorcet winner,
s(1)− s(k) = g(1, k)− g(k, 1) > 0, a contradiction. Moreover, we know from
Case 3 above that a three candidate tie is possible only if all the scores are .5,
which is impossible if candidate 1 is one of them. It follows that all winning
candidates are at xm. That completes the proof.
3.3 Comparison with Plurality voting
The above result should be contrasted with what happens under other voting
rules. Consider Plurality rule and take K > 2 (at least 3 candidates). The
models of rational voting which are similar to the one used here, such as those
of Myerson and Weber (1993), Myerson (2002), or Laslier (2009), provide, as
can be easily seen, the following behavior.
Rational behavior for the voter, under the plurality rule is basically to
vote for the one she prefers among the two first-ranked candidates. Consider
the simple case of the single-peaked model on the real line. Suppose that
all candidates are at the median, each one receiving 1/K of the votes and
having thus the probability 1/K of being elected. Then suppose that one
candidate, say k = 1, moves slightly away from this position to some new
position, say x01 = x
m + ε on the right of xm. This produces a situation in
which the electorate is essentially split in two: the left-wing prefers x2 =
x3 = ... = x4 = x
m and the right-wing prefers x1 = x01 = x
m + ε.
This potentially gives to the mover almost 1/2 of the votes while the
remaining (K − 1) candidates have to share the remaining votes. Under
most reasonable assumption as to voters’ behavior, the strength of the split-
majority phenomena will be such that candidate 1 will be elected with prob-
ability 1. Therefore the situation in which all candidates propose the median
is not an equilibrium, exept if voters’ beliefs are such that all votes gather on
two candidates only. An equilibrium is obtained when only two candidates
are located at the median and receive half of the votes while the other candi-
dates receive none. This point (only two parties can survive under Plurality
voting), which has been emphasized by Cox (1997) after Duverger (1954) is
not valid for approval voting. Further studies on this subject also endogenise
the number of candidates running for oﬃce: see Dellis and Oak (2006) and
Dellis (2010).
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4 Extensions
We need to discuss two extensions of the above model. First, we have as-
sumed that candidates maximize their probability of winning the election.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that they try to maximize their vic-
tory margin (or minimize their defeat margin), that is, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
candidate k maximizes
s(k)
maxk0∈{1,...,K}\{k} s(k0)
.
This assumption is more diﬃcult to justify in the case of approval voting than
in the standard two-party plurality case because it is not clear whether one
should consider the abolute or relative number of approval votes. Anyway,
we conjecture that our three results remain true under this assumption.
The second extension is about the source of uncertainty facing voters.
We have assumed that each vote of each voter had a fixed probability of
not being recorded. We might have assumed, instead, that each voter had a
fixed probability of not going to vote. Under this assumption, there is some
correlation between the probability that votes are not recorded. Indeed, if a
voter planning to vote for k and k0 does not vote, none of her two votes are
recorded. Unfortunately, our results do not extend to that case. Nunez (2009)
has shown that Laslier (2009)’s result does not hold under this alternative
assumption. The same kind of example as the one developed in Nunez (2009)
applies in the model we have studied in this chapter.
In conclusion, we have found a new kind of elections in which approval
voting leads to electing a Condorcet winner. Compared to Laslier (2009), our
results show that if policy positions are endogeneous and follow from candi-
date competition, then strategic voting based on vote uncertainty leads to the
election of the Condorcet winner when it exists. A consequence of electoral
competition is that voters may be indiﬀerent between pairs of candidates,
a case which was excluded from Laslier’s analysis. We showed that indif-
ferences could prevent the general result from holding. Nonetheless, when
voters have single-peaked preferences, in spite of possible indiﬀerences, elec-
toral competition leads all candidates to propose the median policy platform.
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